Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

Dean Hales and Valda Hales v. Vance Peterson and
Margery Peterson, dba Valley Builders Supply
Company and Paul Caldwell : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Don J. Hanson; Dilworth Woolley; Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hales v. Peterson, No. 9294 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3735

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

L E.

STATE OF uTAI-i
DEAN HALES and VALDA
HALES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
VANCE PETERSON and
MARGERY PETERSON,
d.'b.a. Valley Builders Supply
Company, and 'PAUL
CALDWELL,
Defendants and Respondents.

·-----···· ···-·· -···--·-· .... -,----·--···~

.~. ~;,;pr;;r."l~

Cv;.::-;. ~.•H.:.h

Case No. 9'294

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

DON J. HANSON
DILWORTH WOOLLEY
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE -----------------------------------------------·

1

STATEMENT 0 F FACTS ------------------------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS --------------------------------------------

15

ARGUMENT _____ ------------------------------------------_____________ __________

15

POINT I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT DESPITE PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTION THAT THE OVERWH'ELMING EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A DIRECTED VERDICT
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS. ------·---------------------------------

15

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING THE PLAINTIFFS' EVID'ENCE
RELATING TO THE LENGTH OF TIME IT
TOOK THE GIRLS OF THE SAME AGE AS
DECEASED TO WALK OR RUN A DISTANCE
0 F 100 FEET. ------------------------------------------------------------

21

POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 TO THE EFFECT THAT
NILA HALES EXERCISED ORDINARY AND
REASONABLE CARE FOR HER OWN SAFETY. _______________________________________________________ --------------------- 33
POINT IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE c·OURT ON
NEGLIGENCE, PROXIMATE CAUSE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND UNAVOIDABLE
ACCIDENT. ----------------------------------------------------------------

35

POINT V. PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL HEARING AND WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY MISCONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS' C 0 U N S E L OR INSTRUCTIONS
WHICH WERE GIVEN ·OR WERE N'OT GIVEN
BY THE TRIAL COURT. ------------------------------------

42

CON CL USI 0 N ____________ --------------------------------------------------------

46

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page

CASES CITED
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co~pany v. Burnett Morgan Bishop. (Ala.) , 265 Ala. 118, 89 So.
( 2d) 738, 64 A.L.R. ( 2d) 1190 -----~--~----------------------Alvarado v. Tucker et al, 2 Utah (2d) 16, 268 Pac.
( 2d) 986 -----------------------------------~---------------------------------Alvarez v. Paulus, 8 Utah (2d) 283, 333 Pac. (2d) 633
Anderson v. Bendily, App. 66 So. (2d) 355 ____________________
Bennett v. Deaton (Idaho), 68 Pac. (2d) 895 ________________
Burton v. Horn & Hardart Baking Company (Pa.),
371 Pa. 60, 88 A. (2d) 873, 63 A.L.R. (2d) 731____
Conroy v. Perez, 148 Pac. ( 2d) 680 -------------------------------Cotant v. United States (U. S. District Court, D. Idaho
E.), 103 Fed. Supp. 770 ----------------------------------------16,
Frederickson v. Costner, 221 Pac. (2d) 1008 ________________
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, (Utah), 249 Pac. (2d) 213 ____________
Green v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539, 244 Pac. 906 ________________
Hooper v. General Motors Corporation ('Utah), 260
Pac. ( 2d) 549 -----------------------------------------------------------Kuykendall v. Doose, Tex. Civ. App., 260 S.W. (2d)
43 5 ------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------Lampton v. Davis Standard Bread Company, 191 Pac.
( 2d) 710 -------------------------------------------------------------------Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah (2d) 79, 262 P. (2d) 285, 291
Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 Pac. ( 2d) 272 ____________
Okuda v. Rose, 5 Utah (2d) 39, 296 Pac. (2d) 287 ____ 33,
Parker v. Womack, 37 Cal. (2d) 116, 230 Pac. (2d)
823 ( 1951) -----------------------------------------------------------------Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah (2d) 193, 264 Pac. (2d) 855 ________
State of Missouri v. Arthur Allison 51, S.W. (2d) 51____
Stuart v. Castro, 76 Ariz. 147, 261 Pac. (2d) 371 --------,
Wa"rryszyn v. Illinois Central Railroad Company·
(Ill.), 10 Ill. App. (2d) 394, 135 N.E. (2d) 154,
61 A.L.R. ( 2d) 801 ----------------------------------------------------

28
19
20
40
36
29
44
17
44
34
19
31
40
44
34
40
34
39
16
25
40
30

TEXTS CITED
20 Am. J ur. 249 ______________________ -----------------------------------------20 Am. J ur. 651 ---------------------------------------------------------------53 Am. J ur. 407 ---------------------------------------------------------------Blashfield's Cyclopedia Of Automobile Law And Practice, Volume 2A, section 1492 -------------------------------Jury Instruction Forms For Utah, 16.6 and 16.1 ____________

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
27
43
18
39

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DEAN HALES and VALDA
HALES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
VANCE PETERSON and
MARGERY PETERSON,
d.b.a. Valley Builders Supply
Company, and PAUL
CALDWELL,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9294

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by the plaintiffs to
recover for the alleged wrongful death of their
minor child, Nila Hales, who was struck by a truck
operated by the defendants on October 24, 1958 in
Redmond, Utah (R. 1-3). The case was tried before
the Honorable John L. Sevy, Jr., sitting with a
jury, at Richfield, Sevier County, State of Utah
commencing on the 7th day of March 1960 ( R. 142) .
At the conclusion of the evidence the case was submitted to the jury (R. 366), who returned a verdict of "no cause of action" in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
1
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Plaintiffs filed a Motion For New Trial upon
various grounds which included that the trial court
erred in the i11structions given to the jury and erred
in that it failed to give other instructions; that the
trial court refused to adm.it evidence of certain
tests which the plaintiffs had made; that defense
counsel was guilty of misconduct; and that the
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
\The questions to be decided in a general way_ then
are: Whether or not the evidence was so favorable
to the plaintiffs as to compel a finding by the jury
that they were entitled to recover; whether or not
the trial court should have permitted the evidence
of tests made by the plaintiffs to be admitted;
whether the trial court erred in the instructions
which it gave or refused to give to the jury; an~
whether or not plaintiffs received a fair and impartial hearing.
I

The facts of the case are as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident occurred in front of an elementary
school in Redmond, Utah ( R. 7-8) . The general area
is illustrated by a diagram (Exhibit 9) and a series
of pictures (Exhibits 8, 11 and A). The elementary
school building is located on the north side of a
street which extends in an east-west direction. The
front of the school building is located a distance of
2
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58.5 feet from the north side of the aforementioned
street. There are a slide, teeters and swings located in a playground area southeast of the school
building. The slide, which is the piece of playground
equipment closest to the north side of the street, is
17 feet north of the curb line of the street. The
school building is approximately 108 feet from a
street which borders the school grounds on the west
extending north-south. The area between the school
building and this street is clear or open. The school
grounds are not enclosed with a fence or anything
of that nature (R. 249).
There was a gravel walk on the north side of
the street extending east-west and a cement walk
on the south side of this street ( R. 229).
According to the diagram (Exhibit 9) the street
in front of the school was 48;3 feet wide from curb
to curb. According to one of the investigating officers, State Highway Patrolman Bud G. Larson, the
street is 49 feet 6 inches from curb to curb ( R. 229).
The street is h'ard surfaced although the record does
not disclose whether this is asphalt, oil or pavement
(see Exhibits 8, 11 and A).
The sidewalk on the south side of the street
is 8.5 feet wide.
Starting at the intersection of this street with
the north-south street west of the school, there are
3
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no buildings on the south side of the street until we
reach a point 108 feet east of the intersection. At
this point there is a small building 26 feet wide
which is the Post Office. There is then a vacant lot
49 feet wide. Adjacent to this is an abandoned building referred to as the "opera house" in the record.
Between this building and the next building in which
are located some stores there is an alley 11.5 feet
wide which is shown in plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 11.
In the building designated as "stores" there were
two establishments, a sewing shop operated by Mrs.
Carl Anderson on the west side and a grocery store
operated by Mrs. Mathel Mickelson and her husband
on the east side ( R. 328-329). Continuing east there
was another alley 14 feet wide and then a building
19 feet wide housing a billiard hall.
There was a stop sign located on the southwest corner of the intersection of the streets bordering the school on the south and on the west. There
was no painted cross walk anywhere on the street
extending east-west; nor was there any painted
line down the center of the road (R. 234). The road
in front of the school is slightly down-grade to the
east (R. 284).
At the time of this accident there were five
cars parked parallel with the south curb of the
street in front of the school (R. 294, 314). Three
of these cars have been identified as Mrs. Fair4
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bourne's truck, the principal's car and the Hales
car ( R. 17 4). The Fairbourne car is marked "F"
on the diagram; the principal's car is marked "P"
on the diagram and the Hales car is marked "H"
on the diagram.
The principal of the elementary school was
Roger E. Nielsen (R. 236). He owned the car designated as the principal's car, which was parked
slightly to the west of the alley on the east side of
the abandoned building designated as the "opera
house" ( R. 238). The position of his vehicle relative to the alley is illustrated by plaintiffs' Exhibit
No. 11. Mrs. Hales' car was parked directly to the
west or behind the principal's car (R. 239). The
principal's car was a 1946 Chevrolet pick-up with a
rack for cattle on the back of the truck. Part of
the rack is visible in Exhibit No. 11. The Hales
vehicle was approximately two feet behind the principal's vehicle and they were both about six to eight
inches from the curb ( R. 29'6).
The defendant Paul Caldwell, the driver of the
defendant's vehicle ( R. 279), testified that on the
morning of the accident he had been up to a gravel
plant in Redmond, Utah (R. 280-281). He was
driving the truck which is pictured in plaintiffs'
Exhibits 8 and 10, which truck had dual wheels
on the rear ( R. 281) . It has a metal bed with wood
sides approximately 4 feet high. The bed extends
5
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about 1 foot on each side .of the cab of the truck
(R. 282).
Mr. Caldwell drove his truck from the gravel
plant to the intersection formed by the streets bordering the school on the west and the south sides.
He stopped his truck for the stop sign at this intersection (R. 283). He then continued on east on
the street on the south side of the school grounds.
As he was driving down this street he noted five
automobiles parked parallel on the south side of
the street ( R. 29'5) and children over by the school
grounds playing ball. He had accelerated to a speed
between 15 and 20 miles per hour (R. 285) when
·he felt a "bump" on the right rear duals, indicating
that they had passed over some object (R. 286).
He brought his vehicle to a stop within a distance
of 35 feet and upon getting out of the truck saw
the minor child lying in the road approximately 35
feet west of the truck (R. 341).
Mr. Caldwell has drawn a blue line on Exhibit
No. 9 indicating the road traveled by his vehicle
before and after the accident. The spot where the
child was lying is indicated by the 'dark area identified as a blood spot on Exhibit 11 ( R. 289).
Vaida Hales, the mother of the minor child,
Nila Hales, was employed as a teacher at the elementary school which Nila was attending, Nila being
in the fourth grade ( R. 173). They left home the
6
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morning of the accident a little before 8:30 o'clock
and arrived at the school grounds a few minutes
later, where Mrs. Hales parked her automobile behind Mr. Nielsen's truck. The child had some eggs
and pop bottles which she was to take to the grocery store. After they arrived across from the school
Nila went to the store and her mother went across
the street to the school building ( R. 175) . This was
the last Mrs. Hales saw of her child until after the
accident.
Mrs. Mathel Mickelson, who was running the
store across from the school ground's in the 'building
design a ted "stores" in the diagram ( R. 228) , observed the child come into the store a little before a
quarter to nine o'clock with a pan of eggs (R. 329).
The child then left the store and came back with
some bottles, stating that her mother had sent them
in and that her mother would be back at noon to get
a few things ( R. 330). She had a quarter and bought
five licorices and then left the store ( R. 330). The
witness had taken the eggs and started over to the
egg case and had taken seven or eight steps when
she felt with her feet a "thud" on the floor (R. 330).
She ran out into the street where she observed the
child and then ran back into the store and told her
husband to call for help. As she did so she saw Mr.
Nielsen, Mrs. Fairbourne and Mrs. Hales come out
of the school building ( R. 332).
1
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There were two children who claimed to have
seen the accident. The first of these is David Weldon,
a child 8¥2 years of age (R. 261) whose testimony
is set out in the plaintiffs' brief. That he was confused is obvious from a reading of his testimony
and the fact that his testimony is not consistent
with the physical evidence found by the officers
whose testimony will appear later. At the outset,
when being questioned by plaintiffs' attorney, he
testified that the last time he saw the deceased on
the morning of the accident was when she was over
by the swings and that he did not see her come to
school the morning of the accident (R. 262-263).
Upon being asked if he saw Nila when she was
over by the cars ( R. 264) David then testified that
she was over there by the alley the last time he saw
her ( R. 265). Upon being asked where she went
when she was over by the alley, he testified, "I
think she put some groceries in this car" (R. 265).
He then went on to state that the deceased, Nila,
got in the back of her car and then walked out into
the street to the middle of the road (R. 267) where
she stopped and stood and yelled, "Help, help"
( R. 268). The child concluded by stating that he
was not positive as to what happened but that he
was trying to tell how he thought the accident happened.
The eye witness account which it will be seen
8
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was consistent with the physical evidence in the
case was that of Gerald Christensen, a boy 13 years
of age (R. 312). He testified that he was on the
school grounds playing kick-ball when he saw the
deceased and her mother drive up (R. 313). He
saw Nila go into the store and stay in. there for
a few minutes and then come back out and put
some things in the car (R. 313), which was on the
side of the street across from the school house.
She then came around between the front of the
Hales car and the back of the principal's car and,
in the words of the witness, "darted out" into the
street ( R. 314) . The truck at that point evidently
passed between the witness and the deceased as he
just caught a glance of her between the cab and
the rack of the defendants' truck. It was his impression that she was struck by the rack of the
truck ( R. '316) . On cross examination he stated
that "it looked like the rack had hit her and the
wheels had caught her someway and flipped her".
The first investigating officer to arrive at the
scene of the accident was Carl Anderson, who at
the time of this accident was the city marshal of
Redmond City (R. 338). He was told of the accident by his wife at approximately 20 or 15 minutes
to 9:00 and went immediately to the scene where
he found Mrs. Hales kneeling beside the body, Bessie
Poulson, Mrs. Mickelson and the truck driver, Paul
9
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C·aidwell. He first called an ambulance ~and then
that he. did
interviewed Mr. Caldwell, who
told him
.
.
not see the child ( R. 341) . He observed three . cars
parked in the immediate vicinity, which have been
previously identified as the principal's car, Mrs.
Hales' car and the Fairbourne car. He measured the
distance from the body to the defendants' truck.
He found the truck to be 35 feet to the east of the
body. He then authorized the defendant Paul Caldwell to move his truck s.o that other traffic might
pass up and down the street. When the other officers
from the Sheriff's office and the highway patrol
arrived, the witness, Carl Anderson, an~d they made
an inspection of the truck for any indication as
to what part of the truck had hit the child. The
only marks that they could find on the truck was
some blood between the duals on the right rear of
the truck. He took no other measurements at the
scene but did observe tread marks leading from
the body of the deceased and a small blood spot at
approximately the distance of one turn of the wheel
from the body of the deceased.
.

.

.

'

..

Another officer who investigated the accident
was Murvin L. Colby, Chief Deputy Sheriff of
Sevier County (R. 193), who arriveid at the scene
shortly after 9 :00 o'clock A.M. At the time he arrived Highway Patrolman Bud Larsen and Carl
Anderson, City Marshal of Redmond,· and a number
10
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of the town people were around. The deceased had
been taken from the scene of the accident. He took
the pictures Exhibits 8, 10 and 11 and defendants'
Exhibit A. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 8 and 11 show the
large blood spot which he found on the highway ( R.
195-19'7) . Exhibit 11 also shows the alley between
the opera building and the stores previously referred to and principal Nielsen's truck which was
parked immediately to the west of the alley. Exhibit 10 is a picture of the defendants' truck (R.
196) and Defendants' Exhibit A shows the approximate location of the blood spots with reference to
the sides of the street. The officer in that picture
is standing in the area marked by the blood. He
was also present at the interview with the defendant driver, Paul Caldwell, who stated that he was
coming down the road and felt a "'bump". Knowing that no "bump" should be there, he knew he
must have run over something. He stopped his truck
and got out and saw the child lying on the street.
He stated that at the time he thought he was going
around 15, but not exceeding 20 miles per hour;
that he had stopped at a stop sign just half a block
prior to that ( R. 199) . He also participated in the
inspection of the defendants' truck for any indication as to what part of the truck had struck the
child and foun'd no marks on the entire truck with
the exception of a blood stain on the outside of the
inside dual of the right rear wheel (R. 205).
11
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Highway Patrolman Bud Larson was the officer who made the measu~ements at the scene of
the accident. His testimony is illustrated by the
green pencil marks on the diagram, plaintiffs' Exhibit 9 (R. 217). There was a blood spot on the road
approximately 2 feet in diameter (R. 223). It was
18 feet 5 inches from the south side of the road to
the _center of the blood spot ( R. 223) and 31 feet
from that spot to the north curb ( R. 230) . There
was a small second blood spot approximately one
roll of a truck tire from the first ( R. 223) . The
street was 49 feet 6 inches wide from curb to curb
( R. 229) He observed the pickup truck with the
high rack on it on the south side of the street immediately west of the alley (R. 226) and the second
vehicle (the Hales' vehicle) immediately behind it
(R. 227). He also participated in the inspection of
the defendants'_ vehicle and found no marks on the
vehicle except on the rear dual wheels (R. 230) He
testified that he did not see any scuff marks or
debris on the highway indicating the course of the
truck from the child's body to any point east of
there (R. 224) and that there was no marked cross
walk in the area ( R. 234). He said the posted speed
limit in the area was 20 miles per hour ( R. 232).
1

The school principal, Roger E. Nielsen, who
had previously testified as a witness for the plaintiffs, took the stand near the end of the plaintiffs'
12
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case to testify to a test which he had conducted.
He testified that he took seven girls and asked them
first to walk 100 feet at the normal pace they would
walk coming to school, then to go back and walk
as fast as they could without running, and the third
time to run that distance at as fast a speed as they
coul'd run. He then proposed to testify as to the individual times that each of these individual girls
walked leisurely, fast or ran 100 feet. His proposed answer was objected to on the ground that
there was no evidence that this child walked or ran
into the street, upon the further ground that any
statistical analysis of anything based on seven
people would not be a reliable statistical analysis,
upon the further ground that the speed at which
children walk or run is something that is within
the experience of ordinary human beings and not
something on which the jury needs expert testimony, and that the testimony was therefore incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial (R. 299, 300,
301). The court excluded the testimony and the
plaintiffs in the absence of the jury explained to
the court that assuming that the child's body was
lying 18 feet 5 inches from the curb, and assuming that the child's body had been passed over by
one or more of the right wheels of the truck, and
assuming that the truck was traveling at a speed
of approximately 15 to 20 miles per hour and
generally parallel to the road, and assuming that
13
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there was a truck 82 inches wide parkeld within . 6
inches of the .south curb and a touring car directly
behind the truck parked within 6 inGhes of the
south curb vvith a width of 70 inches, and ass~ming
the child was walking at a speed of the average of
these girls, they proposed to show the minimum
distance the truck traveled between the time that
the child left the north side of the parke·d cars and
the time she was struck by the truck by the testimony of a Dr. Gardner (R. 303). Plaintiffs did
not proffer the testimony shown on page 15 of their
Brief and there is no evidence to that effect in the
record. The court refused to allow the evidence on
the theory that it was incompetent and too speculative and that there was no sufficient hypothesis
or g·rounds on which to base the hypothetical question (R. 309).
After being instructed by the court, whose instructions we shall dtTscuss later, the case was
submitted to the jury who returned a verdict of
"no cause of action" in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs ( R. 369). The plaintiffs filed
a Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict and a· Motion For New Trial (R. 134, 13'5,
136), which were de11ied by the court '(R. 13'7).
The plaintiffs complain of the action of the
court in a number of respects which we shall define and discuss as outlined in the following statement of points.
14
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STATE ME NT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE v·E R D I C T DESPITE
PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTION T H A T THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A DIRECTED
VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFFS.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
THE PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE
LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK THE GIRLS OF THE
SAME AGE AS DECEASED TO WALK OR RUN A
DISTANCE OF 100 FE'ET.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID N'OT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 TO THE
EFFECT THAT NILA HALES EXERCISED ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE FOR HER OWN
SAFETY.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT ON NEGLIGENCE,
PROXIMATE CAUSE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AND UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.
POINT V.
PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED A FAIR AND IMP ARTIAL HEARING AND WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY
ANY MISCONDUCT O·F DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL
OR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN OR WERE
NOT GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT.

ARGU'MENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT DESPITE

15
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PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTION . T H A T THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A DIRECTED
VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFFS.

The plaintiffs cite a number of cases and authorities in their Brief to the effect that a greater
degree of care is owed by a motorist to children
than would be owed to adults under the same or
similar circumstances, and with this we have no
quarrel. The question in this case is not whether
such a degree of care is owing to children. The question is not whether the plaintiffs feel that the defendants were exercising that degree of care at the
time of the acident. The only question which arises
is whether the jury might have found from the
evidence that the defendants were exercising that
degree of care. The jury having resolved that the
defendants were exercising that degree of care, we
must review the evidence in the light most favorable to that resolution, Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah (2d)
193, 264 Pac. (2d) 855.
The case of Cotant v. United States (U. S. District Court, D. Idaho E.), 103 Fed. Supp. 770, quoted
extensively in plaintiffs' brief, differs substantially
with the facts in the case at bar. In that case the
driver of. a United· States mail truck, who was
driving down a residential street, had a clear and
unobstructed view of the whole area, including a
number of children and the plaintiff child. Mter
that accident the driver admitted that he was not
16
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watching the children· but was looking for another
mail carrier in a different direction. In this case
the defendant driver never had an opportunity to
see the deceased child prior to the accident because
his view was obstructed by five automobiles parked
along the curb on the side of the roa:d from whence
she came in front of one of the automobiles. The
defendant driver had seen the children playing ball
on the unfen~ced grounds of the school on the opposite side of the road. The only criticism which can
be leveled at him, if indeed we can criticize him,
was that the defendant driver was directing a greater part of his attention to those children, which,
as we view the situation from his point of view
before the acident occurred, was the prudent thing
to do. In fact, he was doing just the opposite of
the driver in Cotant v. United States, supra. Having
seen children playing on the north side of the road
and anticipating one of them might come into the
street in pursuit of a ball, he was doing just what
the court in that case said he should do, and that
is keep those children under his careful observation. By this we do not mean to imply that he directed all of his attention to that side of the road,
because his testimony shows that he observed both
sides of the road; otherwise he would not have been
aware of the cars parked and the situation on the
right side of the road as the evidence indicates he
was.
17
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The plaintiffs also assume that .~he deceased
had crossed 18% feet into the street at the time
she was hit, which is not 'borne out by the record,
at least as the jury may have viewed it. The child's
body did apparently come to rest in. the vicinity of
the blood spot on the road, the center of which was
18lj2 feet from the south side of the road (R. 223)
and directly out from the east side of the alley
(Exhibits 8 and 11, R. 195, 197). However, the
witness Gerald Christensen, who saw the .child dart
out into the street, states that she came from back
of the principal's car and in front of the Hales car
and that her body was "flipped", which indicates
that she entered the highway at least a car length
west of the west side of the alley and that her body
was knocked or carried to the point at which it came
to rest. David Weldon testified the child was knocked
eight or fifteen steps. (R. 267).
In Section .1492, Blashfield's Cyclopedia Of
Automobile Law And Practice, Volume 2A, the section following that set out in plaintiffs' brief, Blashfield, after discussing the rule set out in plaintiffs'
brief, says :
"However, the mere occurrence of a collision between a motor vehicle and a minor on
the street does not of itself establish the driver's negligence. In order to sustain a charge of
negligence against such a ·.driver, some evidence justifying men of ordinary reason .and
fairness in saying that the driver could have
18
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avoide·d the acci'dent in the exercise of reasonable care must be shown.
"In the absence of such a situation, until
an 'automobile driver has notice of presence or
likelihood of children near line of travel, the
rule as to the degree of care to be exercised as
to children is the same as it is with respect
to adults, and an automobilist, not seeing or
put on notice of children on or near the roadway, is not negligent in failing to decrease
speed, particularly where he could not have
avoided the accident had he decreased his
speed."
Or to state it as the court has stated it in Green
v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539, 244 Pac. 906
"The test of defendant's liability is
whether he exercised such care with respect
to the speed and control of his automobile
as an ordinarily prudent person would have
exercised under similar circcmstances ; the
degree of care bein·g greater when the safety
of children is involved."
Following that rule, this court in Alvarado v.
Tucker et al, 2 Utah (2d) 16, 268 Pac. (2d) 986
sustained a judgment of the District Court dismissing the action where it appeared that an eleven
year old girl was struck by an automobile in an
area zoned for a speed of 25 miles per hour, there
being a question in the case as to whether the defendant was exceeding the speed limit. This court
said:
"Even if the plaintiff were correct in
her contention that the evidence would jus19
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tify a finding of 5 or 10 miles per hour in
excess of the speed limit, she would still be
faced with the necessity of proving that such
excess of speed was the proximate cause of
the injury. Under the facts here shown, that
as defendant was proceeding southward, the
plaintiff darted westward across the street
and came out from behind the north bound
car into defendant's course of travel. Nothing
appears in the evidence, either directly or from
reasonable inference, to indicate that he could
have stopped in time to avoid striking plaintiff, even if he had been traveling only 25
miles per hour. In other words, from anything
that appears, the fact of such excess speed
would not have made the difference between
hitting or avoiding plaintiff."
And again in the case of Alvarez v. Paulus, 8
Utah (2d) 283, 3'33 Pac. (2d) 633, an action brought
for the death of the plaintiff's 22 month old daughter who was struck by a backing truck which was
driven by the defendant, that being the only proof,
this court . held that the
"Plaintiff had the burden of proving the
negligence of Paul Paulus (the defendant)
and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident."
The evidence in this case is that the defendant
driver, Paul Caldwell, was proceeding along the
street in front of the elementary school at a careful
and ·cautious rate of speed, 15 to 20 miles per hour,
and that he was mindful of the fact that he was
passing in front of a school and was keeping a look20
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out for children in the vicinity. The deceased child
darted out into the street and into the side of the
truck, being run over by the rear dual wheels. On
the basis of this evidence the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiffs in their brief have
cited cases to the effect that a higher degree of care
is owed to children, with which we concur. They
would have us infer negligence from the mere happening of the accident and nothing more. To find
that the court was required under such evidence
to direct a verdict or to set aside the verdict or enter
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is tantamount to holding that a driver of a motor vehicle
is the insurer of the safety of all children who enter
upon a highway and liable for any injury which
might come to said children without regard to the
question of whether or not the driver is negligent
and regardless of the circumstances. Such is not
the law and it would have been error for the judge
to so hold.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
THE PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE
LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK THE GIRLS OF THE
SAME AGE AS DECEASED TO WALK OR RUN A
DISTANCE OF 100 FEET.

The plaintiffs sought to solve this whole lawsuit for the jury by having the school principal,
Roger E. Nielsen, a witness friendly to the plain21
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tiffs, take the stand and testify as to certain tests
which .he had conducted, wherein .he had ~even girls
first walk and then run 100 feet .. They then proposed to have this witness testify_ as to the time
that each of these girls took. Based upon this testimony and an assumption that the point of im_pact
was 18 feet 5 inches from the south curb and an
assumption that the truck was going 15 to 20 miles
per hour, they then proposed to have a physicist
speculate on how far the truck would have traveled
during the time the ch,ild was going into the street
and admittedly come up with conclusions as arrived
at in their brief that the truck could have traveled
anywhere from 17 feet to 73 feet. The speculative
nature of this evidence is best illustrated by the variance in the ·conclusion at which the expert witness
would have arrived.
Assuming this proffer of proof to have been
otherwise admissible, it could have served no purpose in the case because there was no evidence upon
which plaintiffs could have framed a hypothetical
question to solicit the opinion of their expert. Plaintiffs assume that the point of impact was in the
center of the blood spot found on the highway 181f2
feet out from the edge of the road, but the Record
does not bear. them out. The only t\vo eye witnesses
to the accident were David Weldon, if indeed he was
an eye witness, and Gerald Christensen. On direct
22
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examination the witness David Weldon testified on
at least two occasions that he had not seen the accident. On page 262 of the Record he was asked
"Q. Where did you see her?
''A. Well, the last time I seen her she
was down by the swings.''
On page 264 of the Record the court said
"THE COURT: Well, he just said, I
believe, that the last time he saw her she was
on the other side of the street on the swings.
"WITNESS: Yes."
On cross examination he was asked the question
''Q. Now when you were being asked by
Mr. Eliason when you saw Nila, you said that
the last time that you saw her was down by
the swings?
''A. Yes.
"Q. Now was that the last time you
saw Nila?
"A. Yes."
If, however, we accept his testimony, he testified relative to the point of impact as follows (R
267)
"Q. Did you hear anybody, did N ila say
anything when she walked in the street?
"A. She said, 'Help, help,' when the
car hit her at first.
* * * *
"Q. Now where was Nila when she said
that?
23
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"A.

In the middle of the road.

* * * *

"A. It was going east.
"Q. It was going east, and then what·
did Nila do when she hollered, 'Help, help?'
"A. The truck hit her and knocked her.
''Q. And it knocked her?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And about how far did it knock her?
"A. Eight or fifteen steps."
So, according to his testimony, if we accept the
same, Nila's body came to rest at the point where
the blood spot was found 8 to 15 steps from where
she was hit.
Gerald Christensen testified that the child darted out into the street from in back of the principal's
car and in front of the Hales car and that her body
was "flipped", which puts the point of impact at
least the width of the alley and the length of the
principal's car away from where the blood spot was
found.
The assumption that the minor child in this
case was walking ·was based on the testimony of
David Weldon and it has already been illustrated
how unreliable his testimony was. But whether we
accept his testimony or not, it is apparent that the.
plaintiffs'· proposed hypothetical question was improper because there is ·no .evidence as to how far.
24
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the child walked or ran. The indications are that
it was consi derably less than the 18¥2 feet that
the plaintiffs assume, and it would certainly have
been improper for the court to permit testimony
upon a hypothetical question which is not supported
by the evidence in the Record.
1

Again it should be pointed out that the statements appearing on page 15 of the plaintiffs' brief
as to what they proposed to prove are not contained
within their proffer of proof to the District Court.
The fact that there is no evidence in the Record to
support the opinions which plaintiffs propose to
show by their expert should dispose of this issue,
but it would seem there are other objections to the
proposed evidence. In the first instance the tests
upon which the plaintiffs propose the hypothetical
evidence and base their hypothetical questions and
have their expert testify were made by a witness
who, himself, was not an expert in the matters tested
and by a witness admittedly prejudiced in behalf
of the plaintiffs and hence their reliability is subject to serious question.
In a criminal case in Missouri, State of Missouri
v. Arthur Allison, 51 S. W. (2d) 51, the State, over
objection of defendant, introduced testimony of certain experiments made shortly before trial by witnesses who were not and did not claim to be experts
for the purpose of demonstrating the effect, especi25
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ally as to powder burns, of the near discharge ·Ot
the- gun with which Ia person was killed, using shells
found in the house. It was urged that the admission
of this evidence was prejudicially erroneous, with
which the court agreed, saying:
" ... The general rule is that a nonexpert witness will not be .permitted to testify to
the results of experiments made out of court,
but that a witness, who is an expert and has
made experiments under conditions and circumstances as nearly similar as possible_ to
those in the concrete case, may be permitted
to state the result of his experiments made
out of court . . . Evidence based on experiments, however, should be received with the
greatest caution. The cautions to be observed are that, unless the experiments are shown
to have been made under essentially the same
conditions as in the concrete case, the tendency is to confuse and mislead rather than
enlighten the jury."
The question of whether or not evidence of tests
or experiments should be received is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. As said iri
20 Am. Jur. 249:
" .... Evidence of the result of an actual
experiment or test is admissible to aid in determining the issues in a case where it is
shown that the conditions under which the experiment or test was made were the same
or' similar to the circumstances prevailing at
the time of the occurrence involved in the
controversy. Such evidence should, however,
be· admitted only where it is obvious to the
26
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court from the nature of the ex-periments that
the jury will be enlightened, r~ther than confused.''
The movement of childre~ is a. generally observed phenomenon and would.seem to be a matter
within the common knowledge of the average juror.
He may not ·be able to define this in specific children
but all of us have, from time to time, observed
children and are generally familiar with the speed
at which they may walk or run or dart and their
relative speed in regard to other objects. The proffered evidence would seem to be inadmissible upon
the ground that it falls within the classification of
those matters of which we all have common knowledge. As is said in 20 Am. Jur. 651:
"Expert opinion testimony, while not
limited or restricted in· its scope to matters
of science, art, or skill, is not allowed to invade the field of common knowledge. Such
testimony cannot be received either to prove
or to disprove those things which are supposed
to lie within the common knowledge, experience, an'd education of men. It is inaidmissible
where the matter under consideration is of
such a character that anyone of ordinary intelligence,. "vithout any peculiar habits or
course of stt1dy, would be able to form a correct opinion. If the subject is one of common
knowledge, as to which the facts can be intelligently described to the jury and understood by them and they can form a. reasonable opinion for themselves, the opinion of
an expert will be rejected. The mere fact that
27
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a witness ·may know more concerning the subject of inquiry and may better comprehend
it than the jury does not qualify him as an
expert whose opinion testimony may be given,
unless the subject of inquiry relates to some
trade; profession, science, or art in which
persons instructed therein by study or experience may be supposed to have more skill
and knowledge than jurors of average intelligence. Unless the subject of inquiry does
relate to some trade, profession, science, or
art, it is within the province of the jury to
form their own opinion, and not of the witnesses, although experts, to express theirs.
It ils possible that the jurors may have less
skill and experience than the witnesses and
yet be able to draw their own conclusions. Expert testimony is not available for the purpose of giving a word of common meaning a
technical significance."
Thus, in the case of Alabama Great Southern
Railroad Company v. Burnett Morgan Bishop
(Ala.), 265 Ala. 118, 8'9 So. ( 2d) 738, 64 A.L.R.
(2d) 1190, in an action against the railway company for bodily injury sustained when a train struck
a pedestrian at a crossing, the defendant's foot having been caught in a crevice, it was held error to
allow an expert .to testify as to the danger created
by_ .a crevice 2 inches wide and 6 inches deep. The
court said;
"The strict question with regard to this
testimony is whether or not an average juror
would be capable of forming a correct conclusion in respect to the safeness or .. unsafe28.
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ness for persons to walk over a crevice two
inches wide and six inches deep in a populous
railroad crossing. If this question is answered
in the affirmative, the trial court was in
error in allowing, over the defendant's objectio_n,_ the expert to expres'S the aforementioned
0p1n1ons.
" ... We conclude that the subject here
under examination, e.g., a crevice in a crossing
(any more than a hole in the sidewalk or
street) does not require expert opinion that
it would be safe or unsafe for pedestrians for
the reason that, given the physical facts, the
ordinary mind is capable of forming a judgment thereon."
And in the case of Sylvia Burton v. Horn &
Hardart Baking Company (Pa.), 371 Pa. 60, 88 A.
(2d) 873, 63 A.L.R. (2d) 731, it was held not to
be error, in an action against a restaurant proprietor for bodily injury sustained by a patron upon
slipping on interior steps which were slightly wet
due to a recent washing, to reject an offer by the
plaintiff to prove by an expert witness that the
steps were improperly constructed in that they did
not contain an abrasive material or have a safety
tread, and that terrazzo steps are slippery and
dangerous when wet. The court said that this was
a matter which was within the common knowledge
of the jury.
Lastly, the proffered testimony would appear
to be inadmissible in that it seeks to invade the pro29
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vince of the jury and decide the ultimate i'ssue on
the case. As illustrated by page 15 of their brief,
the plaintiffs proposed to show not simply how
many feet a car travelin·g at a certain speed would
travel in a certain period of time or how fast a child
could walk or run, but they would have the physicist
conclude that given a certain hypothesis the defendant driver should have seen the child in time to
react and stop the truck prior to the actual impact
and that he was, therefore, negligent, which is the
very ilssue which the jury was impaneled to decide. A ·c·ase in point is Mary Wawryszyn v. Illinois
Central Railroad Compilny (Ill), 10 Ill. App. (2d)
394, 135 N. E. (2d) 154, 61 A.L.R. (2d) 801. That
action was brought to recover for the death of a :railroad employee· as a result of a crated diesel motor
falling off a dolly during a loading operation being
performed by the employee and fellow employees.
The witness was permitted to testify whether or not
in his experience it was a good practice to load a
motor of a certain type on a certain truck, and expressed the opinion that it was not. It was held error
for the court to deny the defendant's objection, the
cou~t saying:
"We believe it can be said to be the law
of this state that neither an expert nor a nonexpert witness may give his opinion on an
ultimate issue in the case.
"The purpose of the ultimate issue rule
30
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is to preserve the independence. of the jury.
Its application should not be ·affected by technical, semantical distinctions. If · the probabilities are that the jury will construe an
e~pert's ~pinion th'at defen·dant's conduct or
.method was b·ad or improper to be the expert's opinion on the ultimate issue of negligence, then, according to the purpose of the
rule, that opinion should not be allowed ... "
The case of Hooper v. Gener,al Motors Corporation (Utah), 260 Pac. (2d) 549, cited in the foregoing case, is somewhat contrary to this rule. In
that case an expert witness was allowed to testify
as to what occurred to cause a separation of the
spi'der 'and rim of the wheel of a truck, the court
.
saying:
" ... opinions as to the cause of a particular occurrence or accident given by witnesses possessing peculiar skill or knowledge
-that is, exp€rts- are admissible where the
subject matter is not one of common observation or knowledge, or in other words, where
witnessess because of peculiar ·knowledge are
competent to reach an intelligent conclusion
and inexperienced person'S are likely to prove
incapable of forming a correct judgment without skilled assistance ... "
It should be pointed out, however, that the testimony in the HoopeT case, supra, went to a very
technical matter upon which the jury would need
very technical assistance. In this case the. question
is one upon which the jury, given ·all of the facts,
can decide the issue.
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.

.

In· this· respect w~ thin~ that it ·should be kept
in mind the purpose for which. th.e.. evidence in this
case was: offered,· and that is as a basis· for the
testimony· of the plaintiffs'·· _expert. For instance,
testimony that a vehicle traveling 15 or 20 miles
per hour will travel ·a certain number of feet per
second, if material, would not be inadmissible since
that information might h·ave been helpful to the
jury. The purpose of all of this evidence, the tests
and experiments was merely to prepare the way for
the hypothetical question which appears on page
303 of the Record to be asked of the physicist, to
the effect th·at if we assume that the child's body
was laying 18 feet 5 inches from the curb and that
the truck was going at a certain speed, what his
opinion would be. We believe that we have sufficiently illustrated that such a hypothetical question
is improper in that there is no evidence in the record
to support it, there being no evidence in the record
as to the ·distance traveled by the child. To have
permitted an expert to answer such a question would
have been sheer speculation since his own estimate
varies anywhere from 17 to 73 feet an·d he is in
effect saying to the jury, take your choice. Moreover, the matters upon which plaintiffs' counsel
woutd have the expert testify are matters which
are within the common knowledge of the jury, are
'b·ased on tests which are not reliable and invade
32
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the province of the jury by substituting the expert's
opinion for that of the jury upon matters where
expert testimony is unnecessary.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NIOT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 TO THE
EFFECT THAT NILA HALES EXERCISED ORDINARY AND REASONABLE CARE FOR HER OWN
SAFETY.

The plaintiffs claim that the court erred in
failing to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction No.
14 as follows:
"You are instructed that based upon the
commonly known fact that the instinct for
self-preservation is such that persons use ordinary and reasonable care for their own
safety. The law permits you to assume that
Nila Hales, at the time of and immediately
preceding the incident in question, was exer. .
cising due care for her own safety. And you
may make findings in accordance therewith
unless you are persuaded from a preponder..
ance of the evidence th·at she was guilty of
contributory negligence, as elsewhere in these
instructions defined.''
This contention is specifically answered in the case
of Yoshitaro Okuda v. Rose, 5 Utah (2d) 39, 296
Pac. (2d) 287, which was also ~ death action. The
court in that case said:
"As to the first point on appeal, plaintiffs were not entitled to an instruction that
the decedent was presumed to be acting with
33
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due care for her own safety. The trial court
instructed that the defendant had the burden
df proving his affirmative assertion of contributory negligence by a prepon·derance of
the evidence, and it has been indicated that
there is no need to give an instruction to emphasize the burden of going forward with evidence where the defendant also has the burden
of persuasion, as here. Gibbs v. Blue Cab,
Utah, 249 P. 2d 213. In fact, it is said in
Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 7·9, 262 P. 2d
2'85, 291:
" ' ... Thus defendant not only had the
burden of going forward with the evidence
but of persua'ding the jury on that issue. So
in cases where the question of proving contributory negligence is involved this presumption can never be of any aid to the representatives of the deceased, because their
opponent without the presumption has the
burden of persu·ading the jury th·at he was
guilty of such negligence 'vhich is a greater
burden than and includes the burden of
going forward with the evidence.'"
1

There is even less need for the instruction in
this case than in the case of Okuda v. Rose, supra,
for in this case there is evidence that the child
darted out or walked out into the path of the truck.
As was said by the court in Okuda v. Rose, supra,
"There is no direct evidence in this case
as to just what the decedent was doing at the
time she was struck; the jury was required to
make that determination from circumstantial
evidence. They may have believed defendant's
·testimony th·at his car did not leave the trav34
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eled portion of the highway, ·11oted the evidence that Mrs. Oku·da was dressed entirely
in black, inferred that- she was struck in the
roadway .and her body· tossed by the impact
to the shoulder. Therefore, by merely being
in the path of automolbiles on a.heavily traveled, but poorly lighted street, they could conclude, she \Vas guilty of contributory negligence regardless of whether she was attempt. ing to cross the street or walking in an area
reserved for vehicular traffic. Such inferences
have always been held proper determinations
for the jury to m·ake."
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT ON NEGLIGENOE,
PROXIMATE CAUSE, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AND UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT.

In Point IV of their brief the plaintiffs complain that the court instructed the jury twice on
negligence, proximate cause and contributory negligence and cite as examples Instructions No. 8 and
No. 13. In Instruction No. 8 the court defined "contributory negligence" an·d its legal effect and in
Instruction No. 13 the court stated that the plaintiffs could not recover if negligence on the part of
Nila Hales proximately contributed to her own injury and death. The court also gave Instruction No.
5 to the effect that it is the burden of the defendants to prove. that Nila Hales was guilty of contributory negligence as alleged in defendants' Answer.
Simply because a term is mentioned two or three
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times in the instructions by the court outlining the
issues. to the jury does not in and of itself create
a presumption that the instructions are prejudicial,
provided the instructions are otherwise proper, and
the fundamental inquiry resolves itself down as to
whether or not it was proper for the court to in.:.
struct the jury in regard to these issues. I think
there can be no question that instructions on negligence and proximate cause were proper and I shall
confine my further discussions to the issue of contributory negligence ·and unavoidable accident.
In the case cited by the plaintiffs, Bennett v.·
Deaton (Idaho), 68 Pac. (2d) 895, an action was
brought by the parents to recover for the death of
their minor son. The evidence was that at or about
the time of the collision the defendant Deaton was
driving his automobile on the right side of a highway in a northerly direction at a speed of about 50
miles per hour. One E'dsel H. Christensen was traveling with a team and wagon on the other side of
the highway in a southerly direction. Several young
boys from 8 to 13 years of age, among them the
deceased for whom the action was brought, diagonally crossed a field from the west and arrived on
or near the highway on the westerly side thereof 'at
the point where the Christensen team and wagon
was traveling. The boys then continued walking in
a northerly direction, not in a body, but at scattered
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intervals. At about the time of, or shortly after,
the passage of the Deaton automobile and the wagon
of Christensen, the deceased was struck by the automobile. No one, except Mrs. Deaton, saw the youth
at the instant he was struck; some other witnesses
saw him immediately 'before the impact ·and others
immediately afterward. Mrs. Deaton testified that
the boys were in back of the wagon and just at the
instant the Deaton automobile passed the back of
the wagon the deceased came with his back toward
them, running onto the road, and was hit with the
left fender of the defen·dant's car. The court concluded:
"From the foregoing evidence it would
appear that it might well be determined that
the collision occurreld in one of at least three
ways. First, from the evidence of Christensen, it might be determined th·at deceased was
struck on the easterly shoulder of the road;
second, it might be determined th·at deceased
was struck while crossing the highway from
the easterly shoulder to the west side; and
thirdly, that the deceased was struck in the
manner as testified to by Mrs. Deaton ; namely, that the 'deceased backed out running b·ackwards diagonally ·across the highway and to
the south, with his back to the car, as the
Deaton automobile was going north and past
the back end of the wagon. As to the first two
possibilities above suggested there was evidence to support a finding by the jury of negligence on the part of appellant Deaton the speed at which he was driving, the fact·
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that he did not see~the·boy or any of the boys,
other boys. being on the highway still fur~
ther north and some being in the borrow pit
on the 'Side of· the highway, until after striking the deceased with the left front of the
car, the fact .that the evidence disclosed no
obstruction of vision which would have interferred with seeing the deceased and at least
some of the other boys under such circum•
stances, and the fact that no warning, of the
horn, or otherwise, was given. There is little
if any eviden·ce of contributory negligence
on the part of the decea·sed with relation to
these first two possilbili'ties. As to the third
possibility as disclosed by the record it may
be conceded that the question of contributory
negligence on the part of deceased was presented . . . "
In this case the most reasonable explanation of
this accident which is supported by the record and
the testimony of the witnesses is that the deceased,
Nila Hales, "darted" out into the street from behind
the principal's car and in front of her mother's
car into the right han:d side of the defendants' vehicle, apparently without looking or ·ascertaining
th.at such ·a movement could be made in safety and
at a point where it was her duty to surrender the
right of way to the ·defend·ants' vehicle. Under the
circumstances, if the jury should find th·at this did
not measure up to that degree of care which ordinarily would be exercise(} by children of the same
age, intelligence and . experience ('as instructed by
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the court) , then the deceased · would :be guilty of
contributory negligence. and it was 'Surely proper
for the court to submit this issue to the jury.
The instruction on "unavoida'ble accident" is
in substan·ce merely a consolidation of Instructions
16.6 and 16.1 from Jury Instruction Forms for
Utah, not that this authority in an'd of itself establishes their correctness. Plaintiffs seem to imply
that this instruction should be reserved to those instances where the accident might be 'due to weather
condi'tions or an Act of God or an extreme emergen·cy and suggest that the jury should ·consider
the unavoid'ability of an accident as an issue or a
ground of defense. ·However, it may be said that
not to give the instruction is to suggest to the jury
that proof of negligence is clear or that the circumstances of the accident tend to affirm negligence
on someone's part or, in other words, the failure
to give the instruction would suggest to. the jury
that they must find that the acci'dent was caused
by negligence on some person's part.
In the case of Parker v. W onuLck, 3'7 Cal. ( 2d)
11'6, 230 Pac. (2'd) 823 ( 1951), a divided ·court held
that there is a rare occasion when instructions on
un·avoidable accidents are not appropriate unless
the defendant is negligent as a matter of law. The
dissent in that case was ·based upon the contention
that the instruction in question added nothing to
89.
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the usual instructions· covering negligence and pro~
imate .cause- and burden of proof an'd that, · there-'
fore, there ·appeared· to be no ·reason to give it. The
most apparent answer to this logic is that the jury
should be made to understand th·at they need not
necessarily fin'd either party negligent.
An instruction which read
"You are instructed that if you believe
from the evidence that the injury to the plaintiff was the result of unavoidable accident
and that the defendants' negligence was not.
the cause thereof, your verdict should be in
favor of defendant. no cause of action"
was approved in the Utah case of Nelson v. Lott, 81
Utah 2'65, 17 Pac. (2d) 2'72.
The instruction has also been approved in the
Arizona case of Stuart v. Castro, 76 Ariz. 147,
261 P·ac. (2d) 371, where an animal suddenly darte'd
in front of ·an automobile traveling at a reasonable
rate of speed on a highway and was struck before
the driver of the automobile could avoid the accident.
In Anderson v. Bendily, App. 66 So. (2d) 35S
the Louisian·a court approved the instruction under
similar circumstances.
As was s'aid in the Texas case of Kuykendall v.
Doose, Tex. Civ. App., 260 S. W. (2d) 435
"In determining whether issue of unavoi'dable accident is involved, facts of particular case must be examined Ito ascertain·
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whether there is presented a theory under
which accident could have happened, notwithstanding all parties to transaction exercised
degree of care required by law, and in so
examining the facts evidence must be construed in light most favorable to submission
of the issue."
Applying that test to the case at hand, the
theory of the defense in this case was that the deceased child darte'd into the roadway and into the
path of the defendants' truck at such a time and
under such circumstances that the ldefen~dant ·driver
was not guilty of negligence in failing to see her.
The jury may well have so found from the evidence
in this case. In view of the fact that the deceased
was a child and not held to the same standard of
conduct as an adult, the jury might also have found
from the evidence th·at the child did not fail to exercise that degree of care required of a child of her
age, experien·ce and intelligence in darting or running into the street, which of course leads us to
one conclusion - that the jury in this case might
well h·ave found that the defendant !driver was not
guilty of negligence in failing to see the child and
the child was not guilty of negligence as ·a child in
darting into the street and that the accident was,
therefore, unavoidable. Under such ·circumstances
it wou~d seem that the giving of an instruction that
they might so find was perfectly proper.
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POINT V.
PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING AND WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY
ANY MISCONDUCT O·F DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL
OR INSTRUCTI 0NS WHICH WERE GIVEN OR WERE
NOT GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT.
1

During his argument to the jury one of defense
counsel did make the statement th·at the highway
patrolman and investigating officers in the case
had not issued any arrest or citation to the defendant driver. This was immediately objected to by
plaintiffs' counsel, who, of course, gave his reasons
for the objection. The Judge directed the defense
counsel not to pursue the matter any further. No
request was made for a direction to the jury to disregard this statement and, according to the recollection of the Judge who tried the ease, none was
given; nor _was there any motion made for a mistrial by plaintiffs' counsel ·at th·at time or at the
conclusion of the case before the verdict had been
rendered by the jury. The matter was first raised
in ·the plaintiffs' Motion For New Trial.
Since the statement was negative in character
no harm would appear to h·ave been done by the
remark. For example, a statement to the effect that
a witness he·ar·d a whistle blow, being positive in
character, has a much greater impact than ~tate
ment by a witness that he did not hear a whistle
blow since a whistle may h·ave blown but the witness
may not h·ave heard it~· The same would be true

a
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of a statement to the effect- that the defendant
driver did not receive a citation .. This· would not
be construed by a jury to mean that he was, therefore, not guilty of any negligence, or at least. not
to the extent that a statement that he had received
a citation would be construed by. a· jury to mean
that he was guilty of negligence. At any rate, the
objection of plaintiffs' counsel and the direction
from· the Judge not to pursue the matter further
would correct any harm that may have been done
by the statement.
As is said in 53 Am. Jur. 407:
"Since in m·any cases the effect of improper argument can be removed by an instruction to the jury to disregard it, the courts
generally require, in order to predicate error
thereon, that an objection be made at the time
of the improper statement, so that an opportunity may be given the attorney making the
misstatement and the court to rectify the
damage. Depen~dent upon the circumstances
of the particular case, sometimes the mere
sustaining of an objection to the improper
remark, or the sustaining of an objection,
together with an adinonition to counsel, will
be sufficient to remove· the injurious effect
thereof.
"In many cases the effect of an improper
remark in the opening statement or the closing argument may be cured, upon objection
of opposing counsel, by· its prompt withdrawal by the offending counsel, and when so withdrawn, in the absence. of. preju,dice, such a re43
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mark is not· ground for reversal. ·Thus, the
withdrawal by a ·prosecuting attorney of a
remark made by him which was obj.ected to
as· a comment on the failure of the defendant
to testify has been held in several cases to
cure the error complained of. Likewise, the
withdrawal and retraction by counsel of an
improper appeal to racial, religious, social,
or political prejudice, made by him in his
·argument to the jury, is sometimes sufficient
to remove the injurious effect of such argument,· particularly where accompanied by an
admonition of counsel by the court or a direction by the court for the jury to disregard
the remark. However, in some cases the mere
withdrawal by counsel of an improper appeal
to social prejudice has been held insufficent
to remove the injurious effect thereof."
The plaintiffs complain of the failure of the
trial court to give plaintiffs' proposed Instructions
8, 9 and 10 and cite in support thereof the California case of Lampton v. Davis Standnrd BreOO
Company, 191 Pac. (2d) 710, Conroy v. Perez, 148
Pac. (2'd) 680 and Frederickson v. Costner, 2'21
Pac. ('2d) 1008 to the effect that a person operating a vehicle near a school ground has a higher
degree of care to avoid children than might be the
case under other circumstances, with which we ·agree.
However, the court covered this standard of duty
in its Instruction No. 6 which was as follows:
"You are iurther instructed th·at inasmuch as this accident and the ensuing death
occurred immediately in front of an elemen44
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tary school house, at an. hour just before
school took up and when students were eros~
sing the street in coming to school and were
also playing adjacent to the. street and that
the defendant, driver, well knew of the presence .of small children using the street, he is
required to use such care and caution as the
circumstances demanded an'd to operate a
loaded gravel truck past the school under such
circumstances employing careful and alert
observation of the danger lying or apparent
in defendant's path.''
This, coupled with Instruction No. 9 to the effect
that a driver of a car on a public highway ha;s a
duty to use reasonable care to keep a lookout· for
other vehicles ·and other conditions reasonably to
be anticipated and to keep his car under reasonably
safe and proper control anid to drive at such a speed
as is safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, having· due regard to the width, surface anld condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, the visibility and any potential hazards then
existing, and the last part of Instruction No. 10
would appear to be a·ddressed to the same point.
That instruction provides in part:
" ... The driver's duty requires him to
be vigilant at all times, keeping a lookout for
traffic an,d other conditions reasonably to be
anticipated, and to keep the vehicle under
such control that, to avoid a collision with
any person or with any other object, he can
stop as quickly as might be _required of him
by condition.s that would be anticipate·d by
an ordinary, prudent driver in like position."
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There is some question as to whether or not
an instruction to the effect that a driver may be
responsibie for injury or death to a child, even
though he did not see the child in time to prevent
the injury, is proper in that it seems to comment
upon the evidence. However, whether it is proper
or not, the mere submission of this case to the jury
with the instruction that they might return a verdict in favor of the chilld even though the evidence
indicates that the driver claims he did not see the
child would seem to be as clear an instruction as
could be made that the jury could return a verdict
in favor of the child even though the ·defendant
driver claims he did not see the child. Otherwise,
the court would not have submitted the case to the
jury and the jury could not but have understood
that they might find the defendants liable to the
plaintiffs under the circumstances even though the
defendant driver claimed he did not see the child.
1

CONCLUSION
The fundamental inquiry involved in this appeal re·duces itself to two questions:
1. Di'd the plaintiffs receive a fair and impartial hearing?
2. If the plaintiffs did ·receive a fair and impartial hearing, might the jury reason·ably find
from the evidence that· the defendants were not li46
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able to the plaintiffs for the death of the plaintiffs' minor daughter or, to state the question in
another way, did the evidence so prepon,derate in
the plaintiffs' favor that. the jury could not, as
reasonable men, resolve the issues other than in
the plaintiffs' favor?
There is no question but that a minor chil:d is
hel'd in a favored status by reason of his tender age,
and the jury was so instructerd in Instruction No.
12 which provided as follows:
"A child is not held to the same standa1•d
of conduct as an adult and is only required to
exercise that degree of care which ordinarily
would be exercised by children of the same
age, intelligence an·d experience. There is no
precise age at which, as a matter of law, a
child comes to be hel'd accountable for her
actions by the same standard as applies to an
adult. It is for you to determine i'f the conduct of Nila Hales was or was not such as
might reasonably have been expected from
a child of the same age, intelligence and experience, under the same or similar circumstances."
Nor is there any question that a driver, once
he becomes aware of children, owes a greater duty
to, children than would be in the case of· an adult,
an·d again the jury was so instructed. It was in this
vein that the case was tried and it w·as with this
idea before the jury that they deliberated and returned ·a verdict for the defendants.
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· · Plaintiffs claim that: they were prejudiced by
a rem·ark of the defense counsel in his closing argu~
ment. to the effect that the defendant driver ·had
not received a citation. It is doubtful that such··a
statement had any effect on the jury, an·d whatever effect it m·ay have ha·d was corrected by the
plaintiffs' objection and the admonition of the court
to defense counsel.
Plaintiffs further claim that they were prejudiced by the refusal of the court to admit the
proffered evidence of their physicist who, based on
certain unrealiable tests by a witness partial to
the plaintiffs, would have offered his opinion, making various assumptions, as to the distance traveled
by the truck and the child during corresponding
periods of time. That such evidence would have been
sheer speculation and not at ·all helpful to the jury
is best illustrated by the various conclusions which
the expert would have testifie;d to, that is that the
truck could have traveleld ·anywhere from 17 feet
to 73 feet during the time the child was coming
into the street, granting certain hypothesis. More
fundamental, however, is the fact that there is no
evidence in this case on which to base any hypothetical questions to an expert-witness, there being
no evidence of where the child was hit and, therefore,- being no basis for any comp·arative analysis
between the distances traveled by the truck and
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the child. Moreover, such evidence as there is upon
which plaintiffs proposed to base their hypothetical
questions comes from the mouth of a .witness who
on several occasions on direct examination admitted
that he did not see the accident.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the defen·dants, as we must do at this point,
the jury, as reasonable men, could well have found
that the defendant driver, even though he was aware
of the fact that he was passing a school ground
was driving at a reason·able speed of 15 to 20 miles
per hour an·d that the child darte'd out from behind
parked cars into the side of the defendants' vehicle
when said vehicle ha:d reached such a point that
the defen·dant driver in the exercise of reasonable
care was not negligent in failing to see her and
stop his vehicle. They coul d well have found, and
apparently did, that her movements prior to coming out into the street were obscured by the automobiles parked along the south side of the road and
that the defendant driver was not negligent in failing to notice her prior to the time she darte'd out
into the street. And they might further have found
that the deceased, Nila Hales, was not exercising
that degree of care which might reasonably be expected of a child nine years of age when she apparently darted out into the street and into the side
of the approaching truck without first ascertaining
1
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that such movement could be m·ade in safety.
We submit that the plaintiffs received a fair
and impartial hearing of their case in the District
Court, that any error which was committed by the
District Court was not prejudicial an·d that the verdict of the jury was supported by the evidence in
the case. To hold otherwise would be to say that
the defendants were guilty of negligence merely
by reason of the fact that the accident occurred and
the deceased was a chiid nine years of age. It is,
therefore, our conclusion that the ju,dgment of the
District Court should be affirmed and the appeal
dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
DON J. HANSON
DILWORTH WOOLLEY
Attorneys for
Dejeruktnts-Respondents
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